Last reviewed: May 2026 | Counter-Terrorism UN Sanctions ISIL DPRK UNSCR 1373
- Australia implements UN Security Council counter-terrorism and proliferation sanctions through the Charter
of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth), with associated regulations for each UNSC sanctions regime. - The key UN sanctions regimes for financial services are: ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida
(UNSCR 1267 and successors), DPRK (North Korea) (UNSCR 1718 and successors), and the
cross-cutting obligation under UNSCR 1373 requiring all states to freeze terrorist financing
assets. - UNSCR 1373 is particularly significant: it imposes a self-executing obligation on Australia to freeze
assets of persons and entities that meet the terrorist financing definition, even before formal designation.
This is the basis for Australia’s listing of domestic terrorist organisations under the Criminal Code
Act 1995. - DPRK sanctions are comprehensive: virtually all financial services to or from North Korean entities are
prohibited, including through third-country intermediaries. DPRK evasion through China, South-East Asia, and
cryptocurrency channels is a continuing major compliance risk. - ISIL/Al-Qaida sanctions apply globally — any financial service that provides value to a listed
terrorist entity or individual is prohibited, regardless of the geographic location of the transaction.
Overview: UN Sanctions in Australia’s Legal Framework
While Australia’s most expansive current sanctions regimes operate under the Autonomous Sanctions Act
2011 (Russia, Myanmar, Belarus), a separate and equally binding set of obligations derives from
Australia’s UN Charter obligations, implemented domestically through the Charter of the United Nations
Act 1945 (Cth) and a suite of associated regulations.
The UN-based framework covers three principal areas relevant to financial services:
- Counter-terrorism sanctions — targeting ISIL, Al-Qaida, and affiliated individuals and
entities under the UNSCR 1267 regime; - DPRK proliferation sanctions — among the most comprehensive UN sanctions ever imposed,
targeting North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes; and - The UNSCR 1373 obligation — a cross-cutting requirement to freeze terrorist financing
assets, implemented in Australia through the terrorist organisation listing provisions of the Criminal Code
Act 1995 and the DFAT Consolidated List.
The ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Regime
Legal Basis
The ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions regime originates in UNSCR 1267 (1999) and has been significantly expanded and
refined through subsequent resolutions, most recently UNSCR 2368 (2017). In Australia, it is implemented through the
Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions — ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida) Regulations 2008 and
the corresponding DFAT Consolidated List entries.
Scope
The regime designates individuals and entities associated with ISIL, Al-Qaida, the Taliban (where applicable), and
associated groups. Listed persons and entities are subject to:
- An asset freeze — all funds and other financial assets must be frozen immediately;
- A travel ban — listed persons may not travel to or transit through Australia; and
- An arms embargo — no weapons, ammunition, or military material may be supplied.
For financial services businesses, the asset freeze is the critical obligation. Any transfer, withdrawal, or
transaction involving assets of a listed person or entity is prohibited.
The 1267 List vs. Australian Terrorist Organisation Listings
The UN Consolidated List for the ISIL/Al-Qaida regime is maintained by the UN Security Council’s
1267/1989/2253 Sanctions Committee. It is separate from — though often overlapping with —
Australia’s domestic listing of terrorist organisations under the Criminal Code Act 1995. Both apply
in Australia:
- The UN Consolidated List entries appear on the DFAT Consolidated List and create the TFS obligation under the
Charter of the United Nations Act; - Australian-listed terrorist organisations under the Criminal Code trigger separate obligations —
including the prohibition on financing or materially supporting a listed terrorist organisation —
regardless of whether the organisation is also on the UN Consolidated List.
DPRK Sanctions: One of the Most Comprehensive Regimes
Legal Basis
DPRK sanctions are implemented through the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions — Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea) Regulations 2008, as substantially amended to incorporate successive
Security Council resolutions: UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016),
2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017).
Scope of Prohibitions
DPRK sanctions are exceptionally broad and go well beyond TFS against named individuals:
| Category | Prohibition |
|---|---|
| Financial services | Prohibition on correspondent banking with DPRK financial institutions; prohibition on processing financial transactions with or for the benefit of DPRK; ban on maintaining accounts for DPRK persons or entities |
| Asset freeze | Freeze of all assets of designated DPRK persons and entities; DPRK Government funds and DPRK Workers’ Party funds |
| Trade | Comprehensive restrictions on import and export of goods from/to DPRK; arms embargo; restrictions on luxury goods, coal, iron, seafood, textiles, and other specified commodities |
| DPRK workers | Restrictions on employing DPRK nationals (relevant to businesses in sectors that may employ DPRK labour through third-country intermediaries) |
| Bulk cash | Prohibition on transfer of bulk cash to or from DPRK |
DPRK Sanctions Evasion: The Principal Compliance Risk
DPRK is widely regarded by compliance professionals as the highest-risk UN sanctions regime for financial
institutions, because North Korea has developed highly sophisticated sanctions evasion infrastructure. Key
typologies include:
- Cryptocurrency-based evasion: DPRK state-sponsored cyber actors (including the Lazarus Group)
steal and launder cryptocurrency from exchanges and DeFi protocols globally. Proceeds are layered through mixers
and cross-chain bridges before being exchanged for fiat currency through jurisdictions with weaker crypto AML
frameworks; - Shell company networks: DPRK-controlled shell companies in China, South-East Asia, and
elsewhere conduct trade and financial transactions on behalf of DPRK entities, with no DPRK branding visible; - Correspondent banking abuse: Financial transactions structured to avoid any DPRK identifier in
payment messaging, using multiple intermediary institutions; - Ship-to-ship transfers: Sanctioned commodities (notably oil) transferred at sea to avoid port
records linking cargo to DPRK; and - IT worker income: DPRK nationals posing as freelance IT workers from third countries,
generating income remitted to DPRK through informal channels.
UNSCR 1373: The Counter-Terrorist Financing Obligation
UNSCR 1373 (2001) is qualitatively different from designation-based sanctions regimes. Rather than creating a list
of specific designated persons, it imposes a general obligation on all UN member states to:
- Criminalise the financing of terrorism;
- Freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, or
facilitate or participate in the commission of, terrorist acts; and - Prohibit all persons within the jurisdiction from making any funds, financial assets, or economic resources
available to persons involved in terrorist acts.
In Australia, this obligation is implemented through:
- The terrorist organisation listing regime under Division 102 of the Criminal Code Act 1995, which
designates specific organisations as “listed terrorist organisations”; - The TFS obligations for listed terrorist organisations and their members under the DFAT Consolidated List; and
- The counter-terrorism financing provisions of the AML/CTF Act 2006, which require reporting entities to
have systems to identify and report on terrorist financing suspicions.
create overlapping obligations for financial institutions — both a sanctions freeze obligation (for confirmed
matches to listed terrorist organisations or their members) and an AML/CTF reporting obligation (where there are
grounds to suspect, without a confirmed match, that a transaction is linked to terrorist financing). An SMR must be
submitted to AUSTRAC whenever there is a suspicion of terrorist financing, whether or not a formal designation
exists.
Compliance Framework: UN Sanctions in Practice
| Regime | Key Screening List | Supplementary Risk Indicators | Highest-Risk Sectors/Channels |
|---|---|---|---|
| ISIL / Al-Qaida (UNSCR 1267) | DFAT Consolidated List (UN section); UN Consolidated List | Connections to Middle East conflict zones; hawala remittances; virtual currency linked to darknet markets | International remittances; trade finance to conflict regions; charitable organisations |
| DPRK (UNSCR 1718 et seq.) | DFAT Consolidated List (UN section); OFAC DPRK SDN entries; UN DPRK Sanctions Committee List | Chinese/South-East Asian shell companies; cryptocurrency transactions from high-risk wallets; anonymous IT freelancing income; ship-to-ship commodity transfer documentation |
Cryptocurrency exchanges and brokers; correspondent banking (especially China); commodity trade finance; IT sector freelance payments |
| UNSCR 1373 (counter-TF) | DFAT Consolidated List; Criminal Code listed terrorist organisations | Transactions to known fundraising networks; donations to unregistered charities; unusual structuring of small amounts |
Informal value transfer; charitable sector; cash-intensive remittance |
Frequently Asked Questions
- Is screening the DFAT Consolidated List sufficient for counter-terrorism sanctions, or must we also screen the
UN Consolidated List separately? - The DFAT Consolidated List incorporates all UN Consolidated List entries relevant to Australia’s legal
obligations, including ISIL/Al-Qaida and DPRK designations. If your screening system draws from the current DFAT
list, you are capturing the UN-mandated entries. However, there can be a short lag between a UN designation and
its appearance on the DFAT list. For highest-risk customers, direct screening against the UN Consolidated List
(available at un.org) provides an additional safeguard and is consistent with best practice. - Our institution processes many small remittances to South-East Asia and the Middle East. How should we approach
DPRK and ISIL screening for these transactions? - High-volume low-value remittance businesses face a particular challenge because the absolute number of
transactions makes enhanced screening on every payment impractical. A risk-based approach requires: (1) automated
name screening on every transaction against DFAT, UN, and OFAC lists; (2) enhanced due diligence triggered for
payments to corridors identified as high-risk for DPRK or ISIL connections; (3) transaction monitoring rules
calibrated to detect structuring, unusual patterns, and high-risk beneficiary account characteristics; and (4) SMR
submission for any suspicious transaction where terrorist financing or DPRK evasion is suspected. - We process payments for a customer who provides IT freelancing services and receives regular payments from
overseas clients. How should we assess DPRK risk? - DPRK IT worker income is a recognised and growing evasion typology. Red flags include: payments from multiple
jurisdictions with no consistent client profile; large or unusual payment amounts inconsistent with the stated
services; payments routed through jurisdictions with known DPRK IT worker presence (China, Laos, Vietnam); and
reluctance to provide evidence of the underlying client relationship or service contract. Enhanced due diligence
should include verified evidence of the client relationship, source of funds analysis, and verification of the
customer’s actual location and identity. Escalate to your MLCO if the DPRK nexus cannot be excluded. - Is it possible to obtain a permit to provide financial services to a UN-designated entity in exceptional
circumstances? - For UN-mandated sanctions (Charter of the United Nations Act), DFAT can issue permits for conduct that would
otherwise be prohibited, subject to the relevant UN Security Council Committee’s approval in some cases.
Humanitarian exemptions, diplomatic exemptions, and exceptions for legal proceedings may be available depending on
the specific regime and circumstances. The process is demanding and not routine — engage DFAT’s
Australian Sanctions Office early and obtain independent legal advice. Under no circumstances should business
proceed on the assumption a permit will be granted before it is formally issued. - What is the relationship between the criminal organisation listing under the Criminal Code and the DFAT
Consolidated List TFS obligation? - The two frameworks operate in parallel and have different legal consequences. The Criminal Code terrorist
organisation listing (Division 102) creates criminal liability for membership, support, and financing of the
listed organisation — which is enforced by the AFP and prosecuted by the CDPP. The DFAT Consolidated List
TFS obligation applies to specific designated persons and entities and creates a financial services asset freeze
obligation enforced under the Autonomous Sanctions Act and Charter of the United Nations Act. A person connected
to a listed terrorist organisation may trigger obligations under both frameworks simultaneously. Compliance teams
should ensure their SMR and escalation procedures cover both the TFS notification pathway (DFAT/AFP) and the
AUSTRAC SMR pathway.
This article is general information only and does not constitute legal advice. Sanctions law is subject to
frequent change. Always verify current designations against the live DFAT Consolidated List and seek independent
legal advice for specific situations.